Security

Security-first, by construction

JUGNU is being designed under the assumption that agents and verifiers can be adversarial. No architecture is claimed to be secure against every attack — these are the principles it is built on.

Principles

Eight non-negotiables

Least Authority

Agents receive the minimum authority required for the task — nothing more, nothing implied.

Fail Closed

When verification is unavailable or ambiguous, the default is to deny, not to permit.

Identity ≠ Authorization

Being known is not being permitted. Attribution and authority are separate layers.

Authorization ≠ Execution

Permission to act does not prove that an action occurred as claimed.

Evidence Before PASS

No action is marked as verified without evidence that survives independent checking.

Verification ≠ Reputation

One verified action is a data point, not a track record.

Verification ≠ Settlement

Verified work does not automatically trigger economic settlement.

Cryptographic Integrity ≠ Semantic Usefulness

A valid proof of data integrity says nothing about whether the work was useful.

Concern areas

What the threat model covers

Provenance

Every action traces back through a delegation chain to a responsible principal.

Replay & freshness

Evidence must be fresh and bound to its task; replayed artifacts are rejected by design.

Dispute handling

Disagreements between claimants and verifiers follow a defined dispute path rather than silent failure.

Anti-gaming

The architecture assumes adversarial agents and verifiers, and is designed to raise the cost of manipulation.

Verifier separation

The party performing work is never the sole party verifying it.

Privacy

Verification should require the minimum disclosure necessary — evidence, not surveillance.

Auditability

Decisions and evidence form a durable audit trail that can be reviewed after the fact.